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There is an urgent need to improve the autonomy, safety, survivability and 
availability of such critical assets as aircraft and robotic (unmanned) systems that are 
subjected to internal and/or external threats in the execution of a mission. The automated 
systems and the human operator are invariably exposed to different evidences that result 
in conflict or disagreement as to the “best” action required to remedy an emergency 
situation. This thesis addresses these concerns and introduces a holistic and verifiable 
framework for the harmonious symbiosis of a complex machine and the human operator. 
It takes advantage of novel enabling technologies from health management, Dempster-
Shafer theory, game theory and a reasoning paradigm called Dynamic Case Based 
Reasoning (DCBR). 
The constituent modules of the human-machine interface architecture pursued in 
this thesis include an on-board automated system that provides to the human operator the 
most accurate and reliable information regarding the platform’s current and future health 
state through key performance metrics specific to the vehicle and onboard sensors. These 
are presented to the operator in a prioritized manner based on mission essential elements. 
A game-theoretic optimization algorithm is employed to combine conflicting and 
incomplete information. 
The proposed human-machine interface architecture is illustrated in the thesis. 
The pilot observes current environmental conditions, reads the on-board displays, and 
communicates with the knowledge base. Similarly, the AS gathers information from the 
 xv 
available on-board sensor suite, represented by the DAQ module, and takes advantage of 
on-board or off-board algorithms to perform data mining tasks. A “smart” knowledge 
base is designed and adopted to function as the repository of similar historical cases with 
the ability to learn and adapt new ones. Case-Base Reasoning (CBR) constitutes the main 
system level reasoning paradigm of the architecture while incorporating essential 
elements of a learning strategy. Similarity metrics and Q learning algorithms are applied 
here to accomplish this task. 
The task of the knowledge base is to discover similarities between a new case and 
those stored in the case library. For this purpose, appropriate similarity metrics are 
defined and exploited. Criteria for the automated system and pilot are defined and 
applied. Here the main contribution lies in defining the suitable similarity metrics for the 
pilot’s current evidence and those contained in the case library; the latter may be either 
literal or numerical information. 
The simulated Graphical User Interface (GUI) is generated in MATLAB and is 
fully described in the thesis. The sections related to the pilot’s actions are depicted in the 
pilot’s input panel section as estimated actions. As shown in the thesis, the estimated 
pilot’s actions are in accordance with the pilot’s input sequence. The overall human-
machine interface is set in a probabilistic framework taking into account uncertainty, 
noise, etc. A filtering action is intended to avoid suddenly changing actions and performs 
the decision strategy in a relatively stable manner. The thesis concludes with test cases 










There is an urgent need to improve the autonomy, safety, survivability and 
availability of such critical assets as aircraft and robotic (unmanned) systems that are 
subjected to internal and/or external threats in the execution of a mission. It has been 
well documented over the past years that human error is a major cause of class A 
aircraft mishaps. Moreover, on-board equipment malfunctions, incipient failures and 
environmental stresses also contribute to aircraft accidents.  There is unquestionable 
and documented evidence of aircraft failures that are due to a lack of correct 
maintenance practices. Human errors are a major contributor to aircraft mishaps. It is 
anticipated that such failures could be avoided if the aircraft is properly instrumented 
to detect incipient flight critical failures and warn the pilot of pending events that may 
endanger the health of the vehicle. 
What is required, therefore, is a fresh look at how we address this critical issue. 
Human errors affect the safety and reliability of aircraft at all stages of the asset’s life 
cycle: design, manufacturing, and daily operations. Design flaws are typically 
remedied via extensive simulations, testing, etc., failures caused by manufacturing 
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defects are partially mitigated via qualification testing at the component, subsystem 
and system levels. Errors induced in operations and maintenance offers an 
opportunity for further improvement in system development of operation.  
Hypothesis:+
Can!we!design,!test!and!evaluate!an!integrated!methodology!for!aircraft!(manned!
and! unmanned)! 9! human! (pilot,! human! sensor)! interface! that! exhibits! unique!
capabilities! to! take! advantage!of! on9board!or! ground! sensing,! data!mining! and!
diagnostic/prognostic!algorithms,!combine!them!efficiently!and!effectively!with!
human! observations,! experience/expertise! to! provide! the! human! (pilot)! with!
“best”!advisories! for!actions! to!be! taken! in! the!event!of!potentially!detrimental!
contingencies. The!question,!therefore,!may!be!posed!as!follows:!Can!we!develop!
a! systems9based! architecture! that! will! contribute! to! enhanced! reliance! of! the!
pilot! on! automated! processes?! Can! we! build! a! rigorous,! reliable! and! robust!
human9automation! interface! that! will! contribute! to! improved! aircraft! safety?!
What!should!be!the!major!modules!of!this!interface?!How!they!will!be!integrated!
into! both! legacy! and! new! assets?! What! are! the! potential! risks! and! possible!
mitigation! strategies?!We!will! expand! on! these! questions! in! the! sequel! as! we!
detail!the!proposed!methodology.!
The+proposed+method/Proof+of+Concept:+






in! real! time! as! new! evidence! becomes! available.! The! concept! may! be!
formulated! as! a! set! of! cooperating,! knowledge9based! subsystems:! two!





for! manned! vehicles! and! on! the! ground! station! (sensor)! for!
unmanned!autonomous!systems!that!acquires!sensor!data/images!
and! performs! a! series! of! processing! steps! from! raw! data!
pre9processing,! data! mining! for! feature! or! condition! indicator!
extraction!and!selection,! incipient!failure!diagnosis!and!prognosis!
of! a! failing! component’s! remaining! useful! life,! assessment! of! the!
severity!of! the! fault!and!communication!to!the!pilot!via!a!“smart”!
reasoning!module!of!the!“best”!advisories!for!corrective!action.!
b) A!human! (pilot)! component! of! the! situational! awareness!module!
used! by! the! pilot! to! list! observations! derived! from! a! variety! of!





c) An intelligent reasoning paradigm called Dynamic Case Based 
Reasoning (DCBR) that receives the Automated System’s advisories 
and the pilot’s intended actions, reasons about potential conflicts 
between the two and activates a conflict resolution scheme that 
attempts to resolve such conflicts and provides the human operator the 
ability to interpret automated system outputs correctly and to 
effectively control the decision making process.!
d) A decision support module whose task is to combine evidences and 
resolve any potential conflicts between the pilot and the automated 
system. Conflicts arise between the pilot’s intent/commands and 
automated system commands/advisories. They arise from the different 
perceptions of the pilot and the automated routines stemming from 
experience, current data and information available to the pilot and the 
control architecture which may differ in content, quantity and means 
for the expedient presentation and follow-up action. The principal task 
of the decision support system is, therefore, to resolve conflicts 
between the pilot’s actions and those recommended by the automated 
system. The enabling technologies borrow concepts from 
Dempster-Shafer evidential theory and game theory.!
e) A Graphical User Interface (GUI) that enables the realization of all 
major modules of the human-machine interface in real time and allows 
5!
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for the demonstration, testing and performance evaluation of the 
scheme under realistic example situations.!
!
The+Target+Application+Domains+
1.!Manned+ Aircraft/Rotorcraft! those! are!
equipped! with! a! Health! and! Usage!
Monitoring! System! (HUMS)! capable! of!
receiving! data! from! sensors! monitoring!
critical! component! and! system!
performance! with! particular! emphasis! on!
the!health!status!(incipient!failures)!of!such!
components.! Furthermore,! aircraft! usage! patterns! are! also! recorded! and!
transmitted! to! HUMS.! It! is! assumed! that! sensors! are! installed! on! the! aircraft!
monitoring,!recording!and!transmitting!data!to!HUMS.! !
2.+ Unmanned+ Autonomous+ Systems+ that! are+ capable! of! sensing,!monitoring!
and! processing/analyzing! a! variety! of! data/information.! The! paradigm! here! is!
that!the!vehicle!crew!consists!of!at!least!two!experienced!members:!A!pilot!that!
controls!and!maneuvers!the!vehicle’s! flight!and!a!human!“sensor”! that!receives!
all! available! data/images/information! and! performs! such! functions! as! data!
pre9processing/filtering,! data!mining,! diagnostics! and! prognostics.! The! human!
sensor,! finally,! provides! to! the! pilot! relevant! advisories! as! to! the! course! of! a!
mission!in!the!presence!of!adverse!events.! !






1.2 Human-Machine Interface: The Case for Technology Improvements 
Human – machine interface concerns the interface between user and 
machine. It plays a key role in the effectiveness of human user system in terms of the 
way information is passed between man and machine. Whatever task is being carried 
out, this interface must be intuitive and representative of the real world. The aim is to 
allow the user to interact naturally, concentrating on the task at hand and not on the 
technicalities of operating the computer. Both the way in which the computer 
interprets the user’s actions and vice-versa are controlled by the design of the 
interface. 
It has been well documented over the past years that human error is a major 
cause of class A aircraft mishaps. Moreover, on-board equipment malfunctions, 
incipient failures and environmental stresses contribute to aircraft accidents.  There 
is unquestionable and documented evidence of aircraft failures that are due to a lack 
of correct maintenance practices. It is anticipated that such failures could be avoided 
if the aircraft is properly instrumented to detect incipient flight critical failures and 







Table 1: Statistical distribution of fatal accident causes  
Fatal Accident causes by category (%) 
Cause 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990 + Total 
Pilot Error 27 24 17 19 21 22 
Pilot Error (weather related) 5 13 10 11 15 11 
Pilot Error (mechanical related) 5 3 3 3 4 4 
Total pilot Error 37 40 31 33 40 37 
Other Human Error 2 5 6 4 5 4 
Weather 19 7 8 10 6 7 
Mechanical Failure 12 13 16 13 14 13 
 Sabotage 3 3 6 7 6 5 
Other causes 0 2 2 1 0 1 
Undetermined or missing 37 30 34 32 29 33 
       
There is an urgent need to improve the autonomy, safety, survivability and 
availability of such critical assets as aircraft and robotic (unmanned) systems that are 
subjected to internal and/or external threats in the execution of a mission. What is 
required is a fresh look at how we address this critical issue. Human errors affect the 
safety and reliability of aircraft at all stages of the asset’s life cycle: design, 
manufacturing, and daily operations. Design flaws are typically remedied via 
extensive simulations, testing, etc.; failures caused by manufacturing defects are 
partially mitigated via qualification testing at the component, subsystem and system 
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levels. Errors induced in operations and maintenance offers an opportunity for further 
development. It is anticipated that such failures could be avoided if the aircraft is 
properly instrumented to detect incipient flight critical failures and warn the pilot of 
pending events that may endanger the health of the vehicle. 
In published studies, the primary focus has been on acquiring sufficient information to 
conclude if pilot errors indeed constitute major causes for fatal air crashes. 
Researchers at NASA Ames Research Center have been developing an approach to 
model the behavior of discrete sensors in an aircraft during flights in order to discover 
atypical behavior of possible operational significance 1 .  The tool, called 
sequenceMiner, analyzes large repositories of discrete sequences of data derived from 
primary sensors that record pilot actions in order to identify operationally significant 
events.  Each flight is analyzed as a sequence of events, taking into account both the 
frequency of occurrence of switches and the order in which switches change values.  
Basic elements of the sequenceMiner could be integrated into human-automation 
architecture. 
The Pilot’s Associate program, a joint effort of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency and the US Air Force, managed by the Air Force’s Wright 
Laboratory, began in February 1986 as an application demonstration for DARPA’s 
Strategic Computing Initiative. DARPA wanted to advance the program’s technology 
base, principally in the area of real-time, cooperating knowledge-based systems. The 





improve the effectiveness and survivability of post- 1995 fighter aircraft. The 
Pilot-Vehicle Interface subsystem provides the critical connection between the pilot 
and the rest of the system. The interface is supposed to ensure that the system as a 
whole provides the information the pilot wants, when it is needed. Unfortunately, at 
that point in time, health and usage monitoring systems were not available to the 
degree required to assess the health status of the vehicle and recommend appropriate 
mitigation measures in the presence of a contingency. More recent studies are 
addressing various human-machine interface architectures to allocate appropriate 
functions between the human and the machine to reduce the effect of uncertainty. 
There is no published information available as to how, in the event of incipient failure 
conditions, automated advisories and the pilot’s evidence/experience can be combined 
effectively and efficiently to avoid catastrophic events. 
In real time / safety critical systems, the effectiveness of HMI becomes critical. What 
better example than the cockpit of a modern aircraft? Gone are the days of hundreds 
of discrete, mechanical instruments. The modern 'glass cockpit' comprises of two or 
three computer screens! Here we have an example of human lives depending on how 
effectively a computer system can interpret control input from a pilot, and indeed on 
how it relays information back to the pilot. 
There are numerous examples of accidents caused by failure of a pilot to enter 
information into a flight computer accurately, resulting in the computer making a poor 
last second decision costing human life! The computer's ability to take into account 
10!
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external factors such as weather, human behavior, birds etc. must be considered and 
evaluated in addition to whether the pilot should have any direct control over the 
aircraft, with examples supporting both the elimination of the pilot and the reduction 
of automation. 
The case for new and innovative tools and methods required to develop, test and 
evaluate a rigorous, verifiable and robust human-machine interface is supported by 
numerous historical events involving aircraft mishaps, as detailed in this thesis.  
 
1.3 Backgrounds and Motivation 
Lessons Learned-Events over the past Years: Air France Flight 447: 'Damn it, 
we’re going to crash’ 
Airbus’s 'brilliant’ aircraft design may have contributed to one of the world’s worst 
aviation disasters and the deaths of all 228 onboard. The official report by French 
accident investigators echoes provisional verdicts suggesting human error. There is no 
doubt that at least one of AF447’s pilots made a fatal and sustained mistake. 
It appeared to be a failure of the plane’s pitot (pronounced pea-toe) tubes – small, 
forward facing ducts that use airflow to measure airspeed. On entering the storm these 
had apparently frozen over, blanking airspeed indicators and causing the autopilot to 
disengage. From then on the crew failed to maintain sufficient speed, resulting in a 
stall which, over almost four minutes, sent 228 people plummeting to their deaths. A 
11!
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few moments later the outside air temperature plummeted, the pitot tubes iced up and 
an alarm sounded briefly to warn that the autopilot had disengaged. 
Airbus Announces A Response To The Pilot-Automation Interface Problems; It 
Is a Reactive Solution; Maybe There’s A Proactive One (Source: SANDY 
MURDOCK JUNE 26, 2014) 
In the aftermath of the Air France Airbus 330 airliner crash in to the Atlantic, 
questions are once again being raised about the safety of flying by onboard computer 
systems.  
Aviation safety expert and journalist David Learmount of Flight Global argues that 
the debate in the aviation industry is not about the safety of flying by wire, but more 
about how much control should stay with the pilot, at what point the computers 
should intervene, and what the manual control interface should be like? 
Both the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation 
Administration have opined that the pilot-cockpit interface has its problems due to the 
crewmembers’ inordinate reliance on automation. Academic research has added 
clinical evidence that the interface needs to draw the captain and the 
second-in-command more into the thinking aspect of controlling the airplane. 





recognized!by! industry!experts.!Good! first!step,!Airbus,!but! there!may!be!more!
that!can!be!done!to!prevent!the!break!in!the!pilot9automation!interface.!
The pilot - aircraft intelligent interface concept (Vladimír Řeřucha, Zdeněk, 
Dept. of Technical Cybernetics and Military Robotics, University of Defence, 
Brno, Czech Republic, ProceedingACMOS'05, Proceedings of the 7th WSEAS 
international conference on Automatic control, modeling and simulation) 
The paper deals with the topical problem of increasing the effectiveness of weapon 
systems by constructing and providing the sophisticated man-machine interface. The 
man is still principal and the most important part of the man-machine system and the 
effectiveness of such system is first and foremost induced by the capabilities of 
human operator. To exert the human aptitude the appropriate intelligent man-machine 
interface (IMMI) is used. The main part of IMMI is the situation assessor and 
recognizer (SAR) providing actual information about state of man, machine and 
environment in form of values of situation variables. The SAR is the mapping from 
set of measured variables to the situation variable set and concurrently it is the model 
of man, machine and environment behavior. The SAR is constructed as a 
knowledge-based system using approaches and methods typical for Artificial 
Intelligence or for Intelligent Control as a branch of Cybernetics.  
Pilots Rely Too Much on Automation, Panel Says - Many Aviators Have 
Difficulty Manually Flying Planes, Study Commissioned by FAA Finds (ANDY 
PASZTOR, Nov. 17, 2013) 
13!
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The F-35 - The Air Force Research Laboratory's Human Effectiveness Directorate 
conducted tests and analysis for the F-35 Lightning II to be fitted with a speech 
recognition system able to "hear" a pilot's spoken commands to manage various 
aircraft subsystems, such as communications and navigation. Researchers at the 
directorate's Warfighter Interface Division collected data and recommended 
improvements to ensure optimal performance when the F-35's new speech recognition 
system undergoes future operational tests. Currently pilots must press buttons, flip 
switches or glance at instruments for status information. The new system not only 
simplifies a pilot's workload but also increases safety and efficiency, since pilots can 
remain focused on flying the aircraft and scrutinizing the combat environment. The 
speech recognition system is integrated with the aircraft's onboard computer to access 
data. Communication occurs through the pilot's oxygen mask microphone with 
command feedback provided on the pilot's helmet-mounted display. 
Better User Interface Design Could Mitigate “Automation Addiction” and Other 
Flying Errors, HF/E Experts Suggest, Monday, December 16, 2013 
Amid news reports on the National Transportation Safety Board hearings regarding 
possible causes of the Asian plane crash at San Francisco International Airport in July, 
questions have been raised about pilots’ overreliance on or failure to understand 
cockpit automation and even whether pilots are sufficiently trained to fly without it. 
Eric Geiselman and colleagues propose that user interfaces that take advantage of 
avionics’ underlying data and logic could enable pilots to better cope with 
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extraordinary circumstances like the unavailability of an instrument landing system, 
as was the case in San Francisco. In Geiselman et al.’s October Ergonomics in Design 
article, “Flight Deck Automation: A Call for Context-Aware Logic to Improve Safety,” 
the authors describe prototype designs that could mitigate errors leading to accidents 
and incidences such as the A330 Air France Flight 447 crash in 2009 and the airport 
overfly of Northwest 188 that same year. 
Pilot Equipment Interface - Level busts are often the result of breakdown of the 
pilot-equipment interface; that is to say, the incorrect handling or interpretation of 
aircraft equipment by the pilot. There are usually two elements to this: The pilot 
makes an incorrect setting or performs an inappropriate action on the equipment; and, 
the error is not noticed or not corrected by other flight-crew members. 
Typical Scenarios 
• Altimeter Setting Procedures. The pilots set an incorrect or inappropriate 
pressure setting on the altimeter barometric sub-scale; 
• Use of the Altitude Alerter. The pilots inadvertently select the wrong altitude 
or flight level on the altitude alerter; 
• Use of the Autopilot. The pilot enters an incorrect target altitude on the Flight 
Guidance System and fails to confirm the entered target on the Primary Flight 
Display and/or the Navigation Display; 
• The pilot inadvertently arms a selected mode or selects an incorrect mode; 
15!
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• The pilots become pre-occupied with the automatic systems resulting in loss 
of situational awareness;     
Land and See: Infrared and 3-D Vision Systems Combine to Help Pilots Avoid 
Crash Landings - Enhanced and synthetic vision technologies (and even a 
combination of the two) promise to make flying on small- and medium-size aircraft 
safer, by Larry Greenemeier | February 8, 2012,Courtesy of NASA Langley. 
In 2011 alone four commercial jets crashed into terrain or an obstacle, killing 140 
passengers and crew, according to avionics-maker Honeywell and aerospace research 
firmAscend. The accidents are known as "controlled flight into terrain." Landings 
could be safer if new navigation displays featuring nighttime infrared imaging and 
3-D graphics that accurately portray an aircraft's surroundings become standard 
equipment on smaller commercial and private planes. In addition to the potential 
safety benefits, Gulfstream, Bombardier and other makers of small and midsize 
business jets are also learning that the same technology can save time and money by 
keeping flights on schedule even in the face of weather that would normally require 
runway circling or flight rerouting. 
Cockpit Display Interface (CDI) 
Aircraft cockpit display interface (CDI) is one of the most important human–machine 
interfaces for information perceiving. During the process of aircraft design, situation 
awareness (SA) is frequently considered to improve the design, as the CDI must 
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provide enough SA for the pilot to maintain the flight safety. In order to study the SA 
in the pilot-aircraft system, a cockpit flight simulation environment is built up, which 
includes a virtual instrument panel, a flight visual display and the corresponding 
control system. Based on the simulation environment, a human-in-the-loop 
experiment is designed to measure the SA by the situation awareness global 
assessment technique (SAGAT). Through the experiment, the SA degrees and heart 
rate (HR) data of the subjects are obtained, and the SA levels under different CDI 
designs are analyzed. The results show that analyzing the SA can serve as an 
objective way to evaluate the design of CDI, which could be proved from the 
consistent HR data. With this method, evaluations of the CDI design are performed in 
the experimental flight simulation environment, and optimizations could be guided 
through the analysis. 
Aircraft Pilot and Operator Interfaces, System Engineering, Avionics System 
Integration, Mary L. Cummings, Greg L. Zacharias, Published Online: 15 DEC 
2010 
The shift from mechanical/pneumatic instruments and dedicated mechanical 
controls/linkages to glass cockpit displays and “fly-by-wire” controls has not only 
transformed the appearance of the modern-day cockpit, but with the growth of 
on-board computational power, the role of the pilot has changed from one of directly 
controlling the aircraft to one of system management and automation supervision. 
This move towards human supervisory control means that computer-mediated 
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displays (primarily visual and auditory) and associated controls are the conduit 
through which pilots “manage” the aircraft and its subsystems. Thus operator 
interface design is critical for safe and efficient operation. This chapter provides a 
brief history of human-cockpit interface evolution, outlines design variables, 
principles, and guidelines for effective interface design, and concludes with a 
discussion of the parallels and differences between conventional manned aircraft 




CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND  
 
2.1 Pilot’s Associate Program 
The Pilot’s Associate program is a joint effort of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency and the US Air Force, managed by the Air Force’s Wright 
Laboratory. The program began in February 1986 as an application demonstration for 
DARPA’s Strategic Computing Initiative. DARPA wanted to advance the program’s 
technology base, principally in the area of real-time, cooperating knowledge-based 
systems. The Air Force wanted to explore the potential of intelligent systems 
applications to improve the effectiveness and survivability of post- 1995 fighter 
aircraft.  
Based! on!Dr.! Bank’s! paper,! the! Pilot’s! Associate! concept! developed! as! a! set! of!




dynamic!environment!by! responding! to! immediate! threats! and! their! effects!on!
the!pre9briefed!mission!plan.!The!Pilot9Vehicle!Interface!subsystem!provides!the!
critical! connection! between! the! pilot! and! the! rest! of! the! system.! The! interface!
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ensures! that! the! system! as! a! whole! provides! the! information! the! pilot! wants,!
when!it!is!needed.! ! Unfortunately, at that point in time, health and usage monitoring 
systems were not available to the degree required to assess the health status of the 
vehicle and recommend appropriate mitigation measures in the presence of a 
contingency. More recent studies are addressing various human-machine interface 
architectures to allocate appropriate functions between the human and the machine to 
reduce the effect of uncertainty. There is no published information available as to how, 
in the event of incipient failure conditions, automated advisories and the pilot’s 
evidence/experience can be combined effectively and efficiently to avoid catastrophic 
events. 
 
2.2 Human-machine Interface 
Human-machine interface is widely used in medical and building up expert aiding 
systems. For instance, in S. Rerbal (2013) the author present the development a man 
machine telemedical interface of information and communication telemedical 
HMI-ICTM, which is a successful implementation for the human-machine interface 
used on the medical area.  
Nowadays experts are providing various human-machine interface architectures to 
allocate appropriate function between the human and the machine to reduce the effect 
of uncertainty. In the paper C. Miller (2012), the authors created a prototype 
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demonstration to illustrate an unmanned aerial systems (UAS) control approach. This 
paper described the key hardware and software components, which is represented in 
Figure 1. This structure allows flexible switches between the described four modes, 
from high level to low level control. As described, multi inputs can be used, for 
example voice input, control bar, touch screen.  For the paper G. Calhoun (2012), it 
is the follow up of the paper C. Miller (2012). In this paper the authors shown three 
evaluation cases to illustrate the approach can fulfill the ability of flexibly transition 
between control modes. Also introduced are topics on how to further develop the 
operator–automation control scheme for future UAS applications. Similar to the 
former paper’s contribution, it demonstrates flexible switches between the four 
control modes. Also, this paper is intended to be applied on multi-UAS control. But 
based on the feedback from the UAS operators, there is a need for combine the speech 
recognition input with touch/gesture input to communicate the operator’s intent to the 
automation, which is not fulfilled in the paper. Also, the voice input takes much 
longer time than touch screen input because of the imprecise lies in the voice input 
routine and natural inaccurate lies in the actions the system can get from the voice 
command. So when we need a better method than voice command. In our thesis we 
use the touch screen and built in the action set library to improve the precision and 
reduce the rate of mistakenly input. 
Also need to be mentioned is the paper K. Sullivan (2013). In this paper the author 
described a method to model a parameterization of flight deck automation known as 
HART and link it to HAI consequences using a back propagation neural network 
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approach. Also, the author uses a decision tree analysis to verify the results. This 
approach provides a good methodology to assess the interaction and exhibits pretty 
good performance. Also, it can be expected to be implemented on a large number of 
domains where safety critical automation systems are fielded and require certification. 
The reason we did not apply the similar methodology is that Neural Networks are not 
capable of large-scale extrapolation because it requires significant investment in time 
and energy to fully train a neural network. 
 
2.3 Automated System for health monitoring 
Automated system could aid the pilot or the operator in many ways as they have the 
ability of collecting big data from numerous sensors and calculating. In the paper A. 
Walsdorf (1999), the author highlights the situation that the cockpits often use 
inappropriate automation concepts and ignore human centered design. It develops a 
cognitive system, which is called Crew Assistant Military Aircraft (CAMA), with 
human-like capabilities as the interpretation and diagnosis of the situation, planning 
and decision making to overcome the deficiencies in crew-machine interaction. It 
comprises several function units. The communication between CAMA and the crew 
and vice versa is controlled by another specialized module, which is described in F. O. 




Also in the paper C. Chen (2012), the author gives an integrated architecture for the 
fault detection of the system. He presents a framework as the integrating software 
platform linking all constituent modules of the fault diagnosis and failure prognosis 
architecture. The inherent characteristics of the framework provide the proposed 
system with a generic architecture for fault diagnosis and failure prognosis for a 
variety of applications. With the use of Bayesian estimation theory, a generic 
particle-filtering-based framework is integrated in the system for fault diagnosis and 
failure prognosis. This is the work we borrow from the past projects from our own 
library. We use the similar idea and build a routine for prognosis and RUL prediction 
based evaluation routine. Instead of the commonly applied fault detection based 
methods, our method will predict the future condition, and based on the prediction, 
the automated system will provide estimation on the health status of the system. 
Also in B. Tristem (2010), the author presents a structure of the human-computer 
interaction. In this paper, the Aircraft represent two-way interactive, safety-critical, 
real-time systems. There is a loop of information passing as follows: 
• The pilot provides an input, which the computer must interpret and use to 
control the mechanics of the aircraft. 
• Mechanical sensors return information to the computer. This is processed and 
passed to the pilot for interpretation via HCI. 
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• Using the information presented to him by the computer, the pilot provides 
more input at which point the loop repeats. 
The main shortcoming of this structure is that in this structure, the system will provide 
the reasoning result directly to the pilot, without any information fusion or 
combination. Thus the pilot will be the one who has to accomplish the conflict 
resolution when there is a conflict between the pilot’s assessment and the automated 
system’s suggestion. This is the additional information processing and computational 
burden for the pilot. Thus our structure will resolve the conflict in the knowledge base 
and provide the combined information directly to the pilot. Then the pilot can take the 









2.4 Pilot’s Intended Action Estimation 
In the paper C.A. Miller (1999), the author cites the essentiality of monitoring world 
states and crew actions to keep the automated system “in the loop”.  Also in this 
paper the description of Crew Intent Estimator is given. It tracks crew behavior to 
infer their intent. The “Crew Coordination and Task Awareness” display consists of 
four small LED buttons located in the upper right portion of each pilot’s main 
instrument panel. It reports, in text, the current inferred (1) high-level mission context, 
(2) highest priority pilot task, (3) highest priority copilot task, and (4) highest priority 
CDAS task. Pressing these buttons permits the pilot to override CIM’s current 
inferred tasks and assert new ones via push button input. This paper did not give any 
graphical design of the panel or any demo on this developed schematic. 
Also in the paper B. Piuzzi (2014), the author is discussing how to achieve an 
adequate level of human-machine cooperation to reduce new types of human errors or 
incidents introduced by the complex interplay of humans and automation. This is 
achieved by developing new concepts that balance operator workload based on the 
operator actual cognitive state and the environment. The structure is fully designed 
and tested with a demo. The panel is shown in Figure 3. 
In the structures described above, we notice there is a trend to let the pilot put in tons 
of information into this system.  However, this will introduce additional workload 
into this system. Moreover, it is not easy for the pilot to precisely estimate the 
parameter values corresponding to aircraft condition in a comparably short time. But 
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precision level of the information putted in will severely affect the performance of the 
system. This is the most critical design flaws lie in this structure. So we develop a 
structure that allow the pilot to input as few information as possible so that the pilot 
can save much more time and leave the rest of work to the knowledge base case 
library. The knowledge base case library built up can be done off-line.  
In H. Wei (2012), a cockpit flight simulation environment is built up, which includes 
a virtual instrument panel, a flight visual display and the corresponding control 
system. Based on the simulation environment, a human-in-the-loop experiment is 
designed to measure the situation awareness (SA) by the situation awareness global 
assessment technique (SAGAT). Through the experiment, the SA degrees and heart 
rate (HR) data of the subjects are obtained, and the SA levels under different cockpit 
display interface CDI designs are analyzed. The results show that analyzing the SA 
can serve as an objective way to evaluate the design of CDI, which could be proved 
from the consistent HR data. With this method, evaluations of the CDI design are 
performed in the experimental flight simulation environment, and optimizations could 
be guided through the analysis. But based on what is demonstrated in the paper, the 
SA module will keep asking the pilot different questions and to figure out the 
system’s situation. However, when the condition is severe, the pilot cannot do such 
large amount of reading and choose the appropriate answer. Thus it is important to 
help the pilot to choose from what he’s familiar with and can generate the action set 
pretty rapidly. So our structure will allow the pilot to act faster and easily put in his 




Figure 3. Knowledge Based System Panel 
2.5 Information Fusions and Conflict Resolution 
Most of the research work conducted in the area of decision fusion is built around 
Bayes Theory. Examples can be found in A.Dromigny (1997), M.A. Rodrigues (2000) 
and P.Lucas (2001). The Bayesian Theory is used to combine information collected 
from different conditions or from completely different information sources. 
Dempster-Shafer Theory is an extension to Bayesian theory. It is widely used in 
image processing, fault diagnosis and other reasoning area. In B. Yang (2006), the 
author presents a demo of Dempster-Shafer applied in induction motors fault 
diagnosis. The features are extracted from stator current and vibration. For each side 
they apply the neural network for diagnosis. Also, the author shows the proposed 
system is efficiency and has potential for real-time. But we should notice 
Dempster-Shafer Theory could only be applied on the combination of two 
information sources both on the evidence level or action level. For instance, player 1 
provides an estimation of failure of each component and player 2 provides similar 
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estimation of these components. Then the Dempster-Shafer Theory can combine these 
two mass functions and come up with the combined mass. However, when the pilot 
only input information on the action level but the automated system can provides 
much more information, not only the suggested action but also evidences support it, 
the current approach does not support this form of information fusion/conflict 
resolution. So we develop a novel conflict resolution to fit our case, which is based on 
the Game Theory structure, to handle this problem. The Game Theory Structure is 
described in the following chapters. 
 
2.6 Mass function and Dempster’s rule of Combination 
The mass function is the foundation of applying the Dempster-Shafer Theory on the 
probability analysis. But how to get the most reasonable mass function based on the 
data is still a not fully solved problem and yet have no general answer. Currently there 
are quite a lot of publications on building the mass function. In the publication of I. 
Bloch (1996) she cited there are generally three different levels deriving it in image 
processing area. The highest and most abstract level, the mass functions could be 
assigned by experts. At an intermediate level, mass functions are computed from 
attributes. This is adapted to model-based pattern recognition. At the pixel level the 
most widely used approach is computing masses on simple hypotheses from 
probabilities or from the distance to a class center, which is explained in detail in S.L 
Hegarat-Mascle (1997). However, this method is only limited to pure hypothesis. The 
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author assigned the feature vector to pure hypothesis, for instance, A is correct. Thus 
in the mass table, there only be values on the pure mass, which result in the belief 
function equals to plausibility value. In this case the author did not include 
uncertainty in this case. So we made an improvement here. We assign feature vectors 
to the other combined hypotheses, for instance, A or B is correct. Thus we can make 
the mass evaluation much more precise by introducing uncertainty in this structure. 
There are also some other methods cited in O. Basir (2007) publication on the Engine 
fault diagnosis.  Basically he gives an idea that estimates the mass functions by 
calculating the distances between the sensors values and the fault symptoms matrix. It 
is a reasonable methodology for quantifying the similarity between two states. 
However, when the state is far from any of the existing states, it is possible that the 
mass value is just evenly distributed, which is not reasonable. We will cite a more 
reasonable algorithm in the later sections. 
Also in the M. Bauer (1996) the author cites that the computational complexity of 
reasoning within the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is one of the major points of 
criticism this formalism has to face. In order to overcome this difficulty 
approximation algorithms have been given aiming at reducing the number of focal 
elements. There are three algorithms mentioned in the paper: the Bayesian 
Approximation, the k-l-x method and the D1 Approximation. This could be our final 





CHAPTER 3  
HMI STRUCTURE  
 
3.1 The Human-Automation Interface 
The constituent modules of the human-machine interface architecture to be pursued in 
the proposed effort include an on-board automated system that provides to the human 
operator the most accurate and reliable information regarding the platform’s current 
and future health state through key performance metrics specific to the vehicle and 
onboard sensors.  These are presented to the operator in a prioritized manner based 
on mission essential elements. A modified Dempster-Shafer formula is employed to 
combine conflicting and incomplete information.  
 
Figure 4. General Human-Machine Interface Architecture 
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The proposed human-machine interface architecture is illustrated in Figure 4. In the 
top middle of the figure is the aircraft, the targeted test bed. The pilot or operator is 
shown on the left. The block under the pilot represents the estimation of current 
system status. The latter is aided by the knowledge base which, in return, provides an 
Figure 5. Structure of Automated System 
input to the pilot for emergency actions. Similarly, the Data Acquisition (DAQ) 
module and aircraft health status estimation block are depicted on the right. There are 
two major information flows, i.e. information collected by the pilot and the automated 
system, respectively. The pilot observes current environmental conditions, reads the 
on-board displays, and communicates with the knowledge base. The Automated 
System (AS), on the other hand, gathers information from the available on-board 
sensor suite, represented by the DAQ module in Figure 4. The pilot and the 
Automated System apply then reasoning strategies based on the information collected 
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and data/information available in the knowledge base. If there is a conflict between 
the pilot’s decision and the AS’s advisory, the decision support system attempts to 
resolve such conflicts using tools from Dempster-Shafer Theory, probabilistic/fuzzy 
reasoning paradigms. The final recommendation is generated by the Decision Support 
System and sent back to the pilot as the final “decision maker” for the “best” action to 
mitigate the current emergency condition. 
 
3.2 The Automated System 
Figure 5 depicts the automated system reasoning modules. The goal is an advanced 
integrated reasoning toolset that incorporates justified levels of automated fault 
accommodation based on prognostic information for enhanced vehicle safety and 
decision support. Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) acquire on-line in 
real-time appropriate data and to develop models, algorithms and software that can 
 
Figure 6. Schematic for Dynamic Case Based Reasoning  
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efficiently and effectively detect faults and predict the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) 
of failing components with confidence while minimizing false alarm rates. Although 
the pilot/operator is tasked to use his/her experience, observations and displays to 
decide on probable causes of an emergency condition and take appropriate initial 
action, the automated system must perform a series of computationally intensive 
processes in order to arrive at an advisory for the human operator as to the cause of 
current adverse conditions and appropriate mitigating strategies. 
 
3.3 The “smart” Knowledge Base 
A reasoning paradigm called Dynamic Case Based Reasoning (DCBR) that stores 
cases, matches new cases with stored ones and exhibits attributes of learning and 
adaptation will be used as the “smart” knowledge base to support learning and 
adaptation while providing the human operator the ability to interpret automated  
Figure 7. Displays for the pilot  
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system outputs correctly and to effectively control the decision making process [34]. 
We view this dynamic and generic knowledgebase and associated exploitation and 
control tools as an essential, novel, and effective way to link and exploit the 
human-machine information sources maximally while it serves as the “smart” strategy 
for accurate and robust failure detection, prediction and fault-tolerance. We pioneered 
the development and implementation of DCBR in fault detection and isolation of 
critical aircraft components. We will adapt these tools to respond to the case at hand. 
 
3.4 The Pilot/Operator 
The pilot/operator, on the other hand, gathers information in a very different way. 
He/she can exploit a variety of data/information sources, such as displays, alarms - 
red lights, personal sensing capabilities- the pilot could sense vibrations, temperature  
Figure 8. Control Panel for the Pilot’s Action Input  
rising, noise, etc., visual observations – look outside the window- rain/ snow, thunder, 
etc., experience, communication with ground or other aircraft. Figure 7 is an example 
of a typical display depicting the general form of the displayed information but 
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avoiding details. The pilot gathers information such as oil temperature, fuel pressure, 
etc. He/she uses this information to assess the current state of the system’s health 
status and to take “initial” actions in the event of an emergency. The operator at this 
stage may initiate a corrective action or communicate his/her intended actions to the 
knowledge base. It is understood that timing requirements and sequencing of events in 
near real-time on-platform are crucial in the final decision making process. It is 
envisioned that the computational requirements burdening the AS will be minimized 
thus allowing for the expedient assessment of the vehicle’s state and the application of 
conflict resolution results. The section we are developing is shown in Figure 8. On the 
left is the Advisory provided by the Decision support System. It is a display screen 
from where the pilot can read the “best” advisory, but cannot make any change. On 
the right is the pilot operating area. It is a touch screen and the pilot can drag needed 
actions from “Action Sets” area to the “Sequences” area. From the action sequences 
assigned in the green section, the knowledge base will know what is the pilot’s action. 
The performance of pilot’s display generated in MATLAB is shown in Figure 9.  
  
Figure 9. Graphical User Interface for the pilot  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE AUTOMATED SYSTEM 
 
4.1 The Health Management Module 
Figure 10 depicts the automated system reasoning modules. The goal is an advanced 
integrated reasoning toolset that incorporates justified levels of automated fault 
accommodation based on prognostic information for enhanced vehicle safety and 
decision support. Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) acquire on-line in 
 
Figure 10. An Integrated PHM Architecture for Fault Diagnosis and Failure 
Prognosis   
real-time appropriate data and to develop models, algorithms and software that can 
efficiently and effectively detect faults and predict the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) 
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of failing components with confidence while minimizing false alarm rates. Although 
the pilot/operator is tasked to use his/her experience, observations and displays to 
decide on probable causes of an emergency condition and take appropriate initial 
action, the automated system must perform a series of computationally intensive 
processes in order to arrive at an advisory for the human operator as to the cause of 
current adverse conditions and appropriate mitigating strategies. 
 
4.2 An Integrating CBM+/PHM End-to-End Architecture for Fault Diagnosis 
and Failure Prognosis 
We will introduce for purposes of this program a rigorous and verifiable framework 
for diagnosis and prognosis, developed, tested and applied to various laboratory, 
military and commercial systems at Georgia Tech that builds upon a systems 
engineering process as the driving philosophy for health management. The online 
modules perform raw data pre-processing, feature extraction, fault diagnosis and 
failure prognosis that exploit available ground truth fault data, noise models, 
experimental data, system models and other tools offline to tune and adapt online 
parameters and estimate suitable mappings [1].   
 
4.3 Physics of Failure Mechanisms 
The foundation for the development and application of PHM technologies is a 
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thorough understanding of the physics of failure mechanisms as critical systems are 
subjected to stress conditions. From the physical components/systems themselves to a 
good understanding of how such systems fail and under what conditions leads to 
optimum Condition Indicator (CI) extraction and selection and, eventually, to 
accurate diagnostics and prognostics.  
 
4.4 Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
The starting point for “good” diagnostics / prognostics is a thorough FMECA. It 
describes the failure modes, sensor suite, condition indicators, possible diagnostics 
and prognostic algorithms. It forms the first essential step in the systems engineering 
process for health management of critical aircraft components/systems.   
 
4.5 Sensors and Sensing Strategies 
Sensors and sensing strategies constitute the essential requirements for fault diagnosis 
and failure prognosis of failing components/systems. The type, location and 
characteristic properties of PHM sensors, i.e. sensors that are specifically designed to 
monitor fault signatures, present major challenges to the system designer. We will 
introduce an approach to determine the type, number and location of sensing 
modalities that maximize the fault signal to noise ratio. We will practice these tools in 




4.6 Data Pre-Processing 
Raw sensor data (current, voltage, vibration, temperature, etc.) must be pre-processed 
in order to reduce the data dimensionality and improve the (fault) Signal to Noise 
Ratio (SNR). Typical pre-processing routines include data compression and filtering, 
Time Synchronous Averaging (TSA) of vibration data, FFTs, among others.  
 
4.7 Condition Indicator Extraction and Selection 
Condition Indicator (CI) selection and extraction constitute the cornerstone for 
accurate and reliable fault diagnosis. The objective is to transform high dimensional 
raw data into tractable low dimensional form (information) without loss of useful 
information. 
 
4.8 Particle Filtering for Fault Diagnosis and Failure Prognosis 
The proposed fault diagnosis and failure prognosis framework builds upon 
mathematically rigorous concepts from estimation theory – an emerging and powerful 
methodology in Bayesian theory called Particle Filtering that is particularly useful in 
dealing with difficult non-linear and/or non-Gaussian problems. [18] Particle filtering 
facilitates the estimation of the state (fault) model over consecutive time instants as 
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measurements become available. The particle filtering routines for diagnosis and 
prognosis are implemented and executed in near real-time and constitute an integrated 
framework where the results of diagnosis serve as the initial conditions for prognosis 
in a transparent and efficient manner [15,16,17,18].  
4.8.1 Fault Diagnosis 
The proposed particle-filter-based diagnosis framework aims to accomplish the tasks 
of fault detection and identification using a reduced particle population to represent 
the state probability density function (pdf) [19,20,21,22]. This framework provides an 
estimate of the probability masses associated with each fault mode, as well as a pdf 
estimate for meaningful physical variables in the system. Once this information is 
available within the diagnostic module, it is conveniently processed to generate 
proper fault alarms and to inform about the statistical confidence of the detection 
routine. Customer specifications are translated into acceptable margins for the type I 
and II errors in the detection routine. The algorithm itself will indicate when the type 
II error (false negatives) has decreased to the desired level. Figure 11 shows the 
anomaly detection results based on an RMS feature. The first plot depicts the 
progression of the feature as a function of time while the second is the probability of 
failure; the last one shows the baseline and fault pdfs at 5% false alarm rate. The Type 
II error is 1.1117% at that specific instant of time. Another performance metric is the 




Figure 11. Typical Diagnosis Result   
4.8.2 Failure Prognosis 
The evolution in time of the fault dimension may be described through the state 
equation, 
!! ! + 1 = !! ! + !! ! ∙ ! ! ! , !,! ,!! !
!! ! + 1 = !! ! + !! !  
where !! !  is a state representing the fault dimension under analysis, !! !  is a 
state associated with an unknown model parameter, ! are external inputs to the 
system (load profile, etc.), ! ! ! , !,! is a general time-varying nonlinear function, 
and !! ! , !! ! are white noises (not necessarily Gaussian) [23,24]. The nonlinear 
function ! ! ! , !,! may represent a model based on first principles, a neural 




PF Detection Routine: data set No.16









Type I Error = 5%. Type II Error =1.1117%
Fisher Discriminant Ratio =1699.9029
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network, or even a fuzzy system.  
Figure 12. The Prognostic Framework 
 
4.9 Case Study: Oil Degradation Analysis 
In our example, we shall discuss the 
intermediate gearbox of the H-60 
(Black Hawk) helicopter. The H-60 
helicopter plays a pivotal role in a 
variety of missions for the U.S. 
armed forces. Variations of the 
helicopter include Black Hawks, 
Pave Hawks, and Seahawks. The 




Corp., says more than 2,500 H-60s are in service with the U.S. Army, Navy, Coast 
Guard, Air Force, and Marine Corps. A schematic view of the H-60 IGB is shown in 
Figure 13. 
Data Collection and Data Pre-processing 
The raw data are collected in the past projects in our lab. For each data set in time 
domain, (e.g. in Figure 14(a)), we first segment the period with signal. For instance, 
the useful information is the period between the two red lines. Then we apply the 
Fourier Transform and come up with the plot of the frequency domain, which is 
shown in Figure 14(b). 
  
               (a)                               (b) 
Figure+14.+Fourier+Transform+of+the+preprocessed+signal+
Feature Selection and Extraction 
First we pick up 10 features as the feature candidate. On the time domain we pick the 
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mean value and the standard deviation. One the frequency domain, we pick the 
amplitude and the spectrum density at 1× shaft speed, 2× shaft speed, 3× shaft 
speed and the location with maximum energy. Then we calculate the correlation 
coefficient of each feature and come up with the table attached. 
 
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 
CC 0.7972 0.3797 0.7867 0.5902 0.2729 0.0327 0.0097 0.2957 0.2368 0.9347 
We pick up the three features with highest correlation coefficient, which are 
!!,!!!,!!!", as highlighted in yellow. 
The next step is we use the feature combination method and come up with a combined 
feature: 
!!"#$%&'( = !!!.!" ∙ !!!.!" ∙ !!"!.!"!
The correlation coefficient is 0.95, which is higher than any individual feature. 
The Diagnostic and Prognostic Algorithms 
Degradation detection and prediction require an appropriate estimation technique, in 
addition to data and a model, as pointed out above. Estimation methods have been 
developed over the past years such as Kalman filtering, regression tools, etc. to 
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address the prognosis problem. We take advantage in this study of a novel estimation 
method called particle filtering that has been shown to outperform other known 
methods while dealing with difficult nonlinear and/or non-Gaussian problems (3). The 
underlying principle of the methodology is the approximation of relevant distributions 
with particles (samples from the space of the unknowns) and their associated weights. 
This is of particular benefit in diagnosis and prognosis of complex systems, because 
of the nonlinear behavior when operating under fault or degradation conditions.  
A fault or parameter degradation diagnosis procedure involves the tasks of 
degradation detection, isolation and identification (assessment of the severity of the 
degradation). At any given instant of time, this detection framework provides a 
probabilistic estimate of the fault or degradation mode. Once this information is 
available, it is processed to generate proper fault alarms and to inform about the 
statistical confidence of the detection routine. Furthermore, estimates for the system 
continuous-valued states (computed at the moment of degradation detection) may be 
used as initial conditions in prognostic routines. Customer specifications are 
translated into acceptable margins for the type I and/or II errors, i.e. the false alarm 
and confidence or accuracy of detection.  
Parameter degradation detection procedure: 
Use data for IGB gear crack to derive a histogram (approximation to a probability 
density function) for baseline conditions. Store the baseline histogram and repeat the 
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histogram calculation as new data is streaming in. At the beginning of detection, 
compare the current situation (histogram) with the baseline; set the false alarm rate at 
(say) 5% and declare the detection of the degrading parameter when the confidence or 
accuracy reaches 90%. 
Prognosis of degradation evolution 
Prognosis! possesses! the! ability! to! predict! accurately! and! precisely! the! future!
condition! and! remaining! useful! life! of! a! degrading! parameter.! Since! prognosis!
projects! the! current! condition! of! the! fault! indicator! in! the! absence! of! future!
observations! and! necessarily! entails! large9grain! uncertainty,! it! is! considered!
widely! as! the! Achilles’! heel! of! Condition! Based!Maintenance.!Prognosis may be 
understood as the result of the procedure where long-term (multi-step) predictions - 
describing the evolution in time of a parameter degradation indicator – are generated 
with the purpose of estimating the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) or time to check the 
IGB. The same particle filtering framework and nonlinear state model suggested 
above will be used to estimate the RUL (4, 5).! The! state! estimation! is! achieved!
recursively!in!two!steps:!prediction!and!update.!The!prediction!step!is!intended!
to! obtain! the! prior! probability! density! function! of! the! state! for! the! next! time!
instant.! ! !
The!detailed!algorithm!steps!for!condition!prognosis!may!be!stated!as:!




! ! ! ! Step! 2:! The! crack! growth! model! is! employed! in! the! particle! filtering!
formulation! to! draw! a! set! of! particles.! According! to! the! values! of! the!
particles!and!current!weights,!condition!prediction!is!carried!out!next.!
When! a! new! measurement! becomes! available,! the! weights! of! the!
particles!or!samples!are!calculated.! !
! ! ! ! Step!3:!Update!the!process!noise!and!model!parameters.! ! ! !
! ! ! ! Step!4:!Repeat!Step2!and!Step!3!until!prognosis!is!complete.                                            !
2.6 Simulation Results 
We describe in this section simulation results derived from the application of the tools 
and methods suggested previously. 
Detection Results 
The baseline result is generated from data set without gear crack. We use this data set 
to generate a histogram as the baseline distribution. 
The Detection result is shown in Figure 15. Step 2, i.e. prediction, is triggered after 




The blue histogram is the baseline distribution and the red one is the current 
distribution. The black line is the threshold which set the Type I error or false alarm at 
5%. From the figures, it is observed that for the gear crack, at time 991h, the Type II 
error, or accuracy/confidence, is reduced to 8%, which implies that the confidence of 
a degrading state being present has increased to 92%. So at time 991 hours, the IGB 




Figure 16 is the result of model tuning and prediction for wearing. Time is divided 
into three sections, which are separated by dashed line at time 991h and 2637h, 
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Baseline vs. Current Distributions
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respectively. Section 1 is the fault detection period we mentioned. At section 2, the 
model-tuning module is tuning the model parameters. The blue line and green line are 
upper bound and lower bound of gear wearing level, respectively. The black dots are 
the measured wear levels. As shown in the figure, the tuned model fits the data well. 
The red horizontal line is the threshold specified by the user; it designates when the 
evolving degradation curve, projected on the time axis, reaches the limit of “normal” 
IGB operation and the IGB is in a faulty condition. The prognosis horizon is shown in 
the following figure. We tune the model parameters to match the model prediction 
results with incoming data. The tuning routine employs the error between the model 
output and the actual data in an optimization scheme to ascertain that the model is a 
true representation of the current parameter behavior. Model Tuning is shown before 
the second dashed line. Prognosis is triggered after 2637 hours. The horizontal 
markers at 5 designate the hazard zone, i.e. the wear level that indicates the IGB is at 






We tested above routine in MATLAB and come up with the attached estimation of 
whole procedure runtime. 
time(hour)
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The mean value is 45.03ms and the standard deviation is 6.43ms. So we know this 







































CHAPTER 5  
THE PILOT’S INTERFACE 
  
5.1 Pilot information collection 
The pilot/operator, on the other hand, gathers information in a very different way. 
He/she can exploit a variety of data/information sources, such as: 
 
• Displays  
• Alarms -red lights 
• Personal sensing capabilities- the pilot could sense vibrations, temperature 
raising, noise, etc.  
• Visual observations – look outside the window- rain/ snow, thunder, etc. 
• Experience 
• Communication with ground or other aircraft.  









The operator at this stage may initiate a corrective action or communicate his/her 
intended actions to the knowledge base. It is understood that timing requirements and 
sequencing of events in near real-time on-platform are crucial in the final decision 
making process. It is envisioned that the computational requirements burdening the 
AS will be minimized thus allowing for the expedient assessment of the vehicle’s 
state and the application of conflict resolution results. 
The pilot’s interface is shown in Figure 10. It consists of several sections. The Pilot’s 
Input Panel is the section where the key actions are placed into the system. The 
operator can use the arrow buttons to add or delete actions and the sequence is 
generated in the blue area on the right. Also the confidence level is inserted into the 
table. The pilot is exposed to the confidence estimate for each one of his/her 
suggestions. 
The interface software estimates the pilot’s intended actions and displays the 
probabilities at the Estimated Action column. Such probabilities are displayed as 
Continue Flying, Landing Preparation and Land Right Now. Precision Level is set at 
0.1%. Changes of the estimated action with time are displayed at the Dynamic 
Condition Monitor Section. Also displayed are the Automated System’s advisory and 





5.2 Sequence Generation 
For each Action set, firstly, all possible causes are listed, accompanying the specific 
action (e.g. land the aircraft) chosen to be executed. The corresponding sequences are 
provided next. When the system is attempting to estimate the pilot’s intended action, 
the action routine proceeds in the inverse direction. The system will collect the 
sequences and estimates the possible causes. The causes are used to evaluate the 
possible pilot’s intended action, as shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Sequence Generation Structure 
When detailed cases are filled in, the resulting demonstration entries are shown in 
Table 2. This table can be used for tracking the action set resulting from the given 
sequences. 
Table 2. Action Set and Sequences Table 
Action Set Possible cause(s) Sequences 



















Landing Right now 










5.3 Coding Scheme 
Using these structures, a detailed methodology for the communication between the 
pilot, the automated system, and the knowledge base, is suggested next. Coding is an 
important consideration in the development of the communication strategy facilitating 
the proper transmission of information. The proposed coding scheme is shown in 
Figure 19. All other models of the overall architecture are integrated into the central 
PC and present no major communication problems; only the communication between 
the pilot and the knowledge base requires special attention. The proposed method is 




Figure 19. Coding Schematic 
5.4 A demonstration of the coding scheme 
The pilot enters his/her assessment of the current health state and the recommended 
actions via a touch screen. The recommended actions are coded in MATLAB by a set 
of rules, as shown in Figure 20, and depicted as a screenshot.  
 
Figure 20. Example of MATLAB coding 
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For instance, the action sequence 
[Take!off,Arriving, Landing] 
is coded as: 
[1,2,6,NaN,NaN] 
Figure 21. A demo of Estimated Pilot’s Intended Action Estimation 
In parallel, the pilot’s confidence in his suggested actions is also sent to the central 
module and saved as a double format number, to be described in the sequel. 
The system finally generates the probability of taking different actions at each time 





CHAPTER 6  
DYNAMIC CASE BASED REASONING 
 
6.1 Cases in the Knowledge Base 
A reasoning paradigm called Dynamic Case Based Reasoning (DCBR) that stores 
cases, matches new cases with stored ones and exhibits attributes of learning and 
adaptation is used as the “smart” knowledge base to provide the human operator the 
ability to interpret automated system outputs correctly and to effectively control the 
decision making process. The knowledge base contains two sub sections: Pilot’s 
library and AS’s library. Cases in the Pilot’s library contain the pilot’s recommended 
sequences, pilot’s confidence and suggested action set. The AS’s library contains the 
key sensor data and the corresponding suggested actions. The structures of the cases 
are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Cases in Knowledge Base 
Categories Sequences Confidence  Suggested Action 
Subitems S1 S2 S3 S4  S5  Conf. p1 p2 p3 
 
Categories Features Suggested Action 




6.2 Similarity Metrics 
The task of the knowledge base is to discover similarities between a new case and 
those stored in the case library. For this purpose, appropriate similarity metrics are 
defined and exploited. For the automated system, distance based criteria are defined 
and applied. Basically, the similarity metric for the automated system cases is defined 
as: 
!(!, !!) =






Here ! and!!! are two feature vectors, of N dimensions each, with !! the weight 
for each dimension. Once the distance is obtained, the inverse of the distance is 
normalized to 1 and the mass for each case is calculated. 
For the pilot’s case, in order to determine the similarity of two sequences of action, 
the first step is to determine if the components are the same and if they are of the 
same order. We call these two properties as similarity of components (SC) and ratio 
of ascending order (RAO), respectively. For the similarity of components property, 
we compare the components of the two sequences and determine the number of 
actions that are the same. For instance, if 
! = !"#$!!"",!""#$#%&, !"#$%#&,!"#$"!! "#$%. ,! 




!" !, ! = 3(#!!"!!"#$!!"#$%&')4(!"#$%ℎ!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&!!"#$"%&") 
It is noted that, when the sequence has a NaN term, this action is not counted in the 
length of the sequence. 
The next property is related to the ratio of ascending order. The pilot enters a 
sequence !! into the system, 
!! = !"#$!!"",!""#$#%&, !"#$%#&,!"#$"%! "#$%.  
which is then translated into a sequence of numbers:  
!! = [1,2,6,3] 
Now, we compare each set of two numbers in the vector and count the number of 
ascending pairs: 
!!"# = #!"!!"#$%&'%( = { 1,2 , 1,6 , 1,3 , 2,6 , (2,3)} = 5 
As there are four numbers in the vector, the total number of pairs is: 
!!"!#$ = !!! = 6 




= 56 = 0.87 
An additional factor, called tuning factor, is also considered. This factor is related to 
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The closer !"#$! is to !"#$!, the larger is !!"##$#%. The reason for choosing the log 
function instead of !!"#$!!!"#$!  is that log function is smoother.  For instance, if 
!"#$!!=0.9, !"#$!!= 0.91, !"#$!!= 0.901, then the terms !!"#$!!!"#$! !will be 10 and 
100. But ttuning will be 2 and 3, resulting in a smaller difference, a more reasonable 
outcome.  
In summary, the similarity metric defined is shown in the following equations. The 
mass is the probability of case a being the same as case c, where !!"  is the term 
related to the similarity of components, !!"# is the term related to the ratio of 
ascending order, !!"##$!"!is the confidence related information; !! !is the weight for 
each item: 
!"## !, ! =
!!"##$#%
!!!!" + !!!!"#
!!!!,!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!" = !!"# = 0!!!
! ∙ !!"##$#%!!!!!!!!!!!!!,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"ℎ!"#$%!!!!!!!!!!!
 
!!"##$!"(!, !) = !"#
1
!"#$! − !"#$!
, !"!!!"#$! = !"#$!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!,!!!!!!!!!"#$! ≠ !"#$!
 
!!"(!, !) = 1− !" !, !  
!!"#(!, !) =
!"# ! − !"# !
!"# ! ,!!!!!!"!!"# ! ≠ 0
!"# ! − !"# ! !,!!!!!!!!!!!"# ! = 0!
 




CHAPTER 7  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION METHODOLOGY  
 
7.1 The Automated System-Pilot Conflict Resolution Methodology 
Conflicts arise between the pilot’s intent/commands and automated system 
commands/advisories. They arise from the different perceptions of the pilot and the  
Figure+22.+Conflict+Resolution+Structure 
automated routines stemming from experience, current data and information available 
to the pilot and the control architecture which may differ in content, quantity and 
means for the expedient presentation and follow-up action. The principal task of the 
decision support system is, therefore, to resolve conflicts between the pilot’s actions 
and those recommended by the automated system. Conflict resolution is a challenging 
task that must be addresses methodically in the presence of incomplete evidence, 
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ambiguity and noise. We may apply such methodologies as Dempster-Shafer Theory 
and Game Theory, among others.  
 
7.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory 
The Dempster-Shafer Evidential Theory is widely used in possibility combination, 
sensor fusion, artificial intelligence, and conflict resolution areas. It allows one to 
combine evidence from different sources and arrive at a degree of belief that takes 
into account all the available evidence [31,32,33]. In this formalism a degree of belief, 
which is also referred to as a mass, is represented as a belief function. Possibility 
values are assigned to sets of possibilities rather than single events. Dempster-Shafer 
theory assigns its masses to all non-empty subsets of entities.  The architecture of the 
Dempster-Shafer algorithm is shown in Figure 22. Application of the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory requires first and foremost the calculation of the mass 
functions, as detailed in the sequel. Methodologies such as distance-based 
measurements can be considered to assess the mass function structure. Fuzzy notions 
or probabilistic design methods may be employed to categorize the fault modes, and 
then distance-based measurements are exploited to calculate the mass functions.   
Finally, with the mass function structure at hand, Dempster’s rule of combination is 
applied to address the conflict resolution problem.  We outline below the basic 
structure of the architecture. 
7.2.1 Dempster’s Rule of Combination 
Assume !! and !! are two belief function structures on X provided by the pilot 
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and automated system, respectively. !! has focal elements !!,⋯ ,!! and !! has 
!!,⋯ ,!! . We will introduce a modified form of Dempster’s rule to combine 
evidences and avoid counterintuitive results faced by classical methods. Consider two 
mass functions !! and !! and define: ! = !! ⊥ !!, where ⊥ denotes the direct 
sum and m is calculated as: 




! ! = !! !! !! !!
!!,!!
!!∩!!!!
, ! ≠ ∅,! 




! ∅ = 0 
It can be shown that the new rule is more stable than Dempster’s original rule. If there 
is a slight change in the belief structure of the individual masses there is only a 
corresponding slight change in the resulting belief structure.  
7.2.2 Mass function Evaluation 
The mass function is the foundation for applying Dempster-Shafer theory to the 
conflict resolution problem. The estimation of the mass functions is a challenging 
problem addressed by several investigators without a satisfactory solution from an 
analytical and computational perspective. The following sections detail its principal 
components. In O. Basir [28] the author suggests such methods for diagnosis of 
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engine fault modes.  This contribution estimates the mass functions by calculating 
the distances between the sensor values and the fault symptoms.  
Distance based mass function estimation 
Distance based reasoning is the standard algorithm for the mass calculation. A similar 
algorithm is described in O.Basir [28]. We take advantage of a classification-based 
method that allows the use of inaccurate information and produces more accurate 
results than a Bayesian structure.  
Let ! = [!!, !!,… , !!] represent the state of the component we are monitoring; !! 
is the ith feature that describes an aspect of the system state, i.e. oil cooler 
temperature, crack size; n is the number of features. Assume that we have M fault 
modes. Assign mass values to !!
!
!!! = 2! − 1 hypotheses. We define the label 
vectors as: 
! = !!, !!,… , !!  
For each !! element in L, !! = 1!means that there is a possibility of the ith fault mode 
happening. For example, if L= [1, 1, 0, 0, … , 0], the hypothesis is “Fault 1 or Fault 2 
occurs”. 
The next step addresses the determination of the state vector X for each hypothesis. 
First, hypotheses with only one element are considered. In other words, calculate 
!(!) for!!"#$(!) = 1. The label vector for this condition satisfies:  
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! ! = 1 
Based on the given database, the mean state vector for each fault mode is calculated. 
Thus, we arrive at the mean basis:  
{!!! ,!!! ,⋯ ,!!"} 







Consider next the hypotheses with multiple elements. For each hypothesis j we have 
the label vector!!!. Based on this, the state vector !! of this hypothesis may be 











= [!!!, !!!,… , !!"] 
 
This process leads to the state vector for all hypotheses. 
On the other hand, the measured state vector could be determined from the sensor 
measurements:  
! = [!!, !!,… , !!] 
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The more similar is S to!!!, the more probable is the jth hypothesis. The distances 
between all sensor measurements and all faults can be captured in a matrix form: 
! = [!!,!!,… ,!!!!!] 
The smaller is !!, the more probable is the jth hypothesis.  





and expressing it in vector form:  
! = [!!,!!,… ,!!!!!] 




! , ! = 1,2,… , 2! − 1 
and the mass function calculated from:  
! = !!,!!,… ,!!!!!  
Probability based reasoning 
Several assumptions are stipulated for this method: 
1) There are N types of faults, and M features 
2) All features are independent from each other 




We use the existing data to fit a two-dimensional normal distribution: 































= ! ! ∙ ! !  
Thus, it is written as the product of two independent one-dimensional normal 
distributions. 
For each fault mode, the histogram is generated and then a normal distribution is 
fitted, as shown in Figure 23. Consider next the hypotheses where multiple elements 
are present. For each hypothesis j we have the label vector!!!. Based on this, the 









































Thus, all the distributions are generated as in Figure 24. For any given states, the 
actual state vector generated from the sensor suite is represented as: 
! = [!!, !!,… , !!] As in our case, there are only two features, then the S=[x!, y!]. 
Define P in a vector form as:  
! = !!,!!,… ,!!!!!  
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Each element in P is generated by the likelihood S for each distribution:  









!!! !!, ! = 1,2,… 2! − 1 




! , ! = 1,2,… , 2! − 1 
! = !!,!!,… ,!!!!!  
Thus, the mass functions are generated. 
For conflict resolution, we introduce the following Mean Error Bar (MEB) metric: 




Or, in discrete form: 




As shown, the belief and plausibility functions give the lower and upper bounds of the 
possibility function, respectively. The value Pl(t)-Bel(t) stands for the ignorance of 
the possibility at time t. Usually the possibility is given by the mean of the plausibility 
and belief functions. If the two values are close, a precise estimate of the possibility 




Preliminary results from stored data/information suggest that both the fuzzy logic 
based and the probabilistic approaches are capable of addressing the conflict 
resolution problem. The choice of one method over the other depends on the data 
availability. With a limited amount of data, the fuzzy approach may reach reasonable 
conclusions in resolving conflicts between the pilot and the AS. With a statistically 
sufficient amount of data, the probabilistic method is more rigorous arriving at 
verifiable results. 
Particle filtering based mass generation 
The first step is generating the distribution for each time instant. As shown in Figure 
25, after we get a new measurement the particles are resampled. The distribution at 
time t is: f!(x, t). The time get last sample is t!. Then distribution f! x, t , t ≪ t! 
could be used for reasoning; distribution f! x, t , t > t! is for prediction.   
The next step is classifying the distribution into different categories of hypotheses. 
Here we can apply the fuzzy set structure. If we want to categorize the measured 









= 1, for!∀x 
Then use this function set to generate the mass value for each time instant: 
m! t = f x, t
!
!
f!! x dx, i = 1,2,… , 2! − 1 
D is the set of x.  After the mass function is generated, we can do the conflict 
resolution.  
7.3 Game-Theoretic Framework 
7.3.1 Problem Definition 
We are pursuing a game-theoretic approach to conflict resolution. The proposed 
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framework consists of three components: the operator (pilot) and the Automated 
System (AS) as the players, the type of game (set as a competitive game) and the 
payoff or objective function. The most critical aspect of the approach is the definition 
of the payoff function. The solution is generally set as an optimization problem. The 
payoff function, for purposes of our goal, is defined as:  
!"#$%%!" = !! + !!" 
It consists of two terms: !(∙)!"#!! ∙ , which represent cost and risk, respectively. 
The cost value depends only on the specific action taken. The risk value, on the other 
hand, is a function of the available information (evidence) or the lack thereof. For 
instance, the evidence shown to the pilot might be suggesting that he/she needs to 
land the aircraft immediately and he/she issues a command “land the aircraft 
immediately”. But under the same circumstances the automated system is not exposed 
to the same evidence and on the basis of the information available to the AS suggests 
“continue flying”. There is obviously a risk that the pilot is correct and the command 
“continue flying” may entail a significant risk. The risk function value, therefore, 
relies on the current status and the actions both players might take.  
Player 1 (pilot) bases his/her action on the estimate of the current system status 
whereas player 2 (AS) suggests a strategy derived from a mix of its own evidence and 
the operator’s estimate.  
The game proceeds as follows: The pilot’s action set is stated as  
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!! = [!!,!!,!!] 
where !!,!!!!"#!!! represent the possible actions suggested by the operator/pilot. 
The conflict resolution module receives and monitors this set. Then, the Automated 
System will use the payoff functions to provide another mix strategy 
!!"#$%&'( = [!!, !!, !!] 
Thus, the probability of the Case “Pilot suggests Action i and AS recommends Action 
j” is expressed as:  
!!" = !! ∙ !! 
And the corresponding payoff is!!"#!""!". So the game is formulated as a two-step 
optimization problem. The first step aims to minimize the total payoff, represented 
by: 











Thus, by solving this optimization problem we arrive at the best !!"#$%&'(, which is 
the advisory provided back to the pilot from the conflict resolution module. The 
advantage of this formulation is that it contains the information assessed by both the 
pilot and automated system.  
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Since the solution to this optimization problem might not be unique, an additional 
step is taken:   




!. !!!!!![!!, !!, !!] ∈ !!"#$%&'( 
Where the !!"#$%&'( set is the one derived from the first step.  
The final advisory is given by solving the optimum of the following problem: 
min
!!,!!,⋯,!!!
! = !! !! − !! !
!
!!!














Here the ! = !!,!!,⋯ ,!!  is the estimated pilot’s actions. This vector is generated 
by estimating the possible pilot’s action. And ! = !!, !!,⋯ , !!  is the decision 
making system’s advisory, which will be provided by optimize the objective function 
E. !!s are the weights for these two terms. PO matrix contains the payoff coefficients.  
7.3.2 Problem Analysis 







−2!! !! − !! + !! !!
!
!!!
!"!" = 0 
So, 




If !! < 0, the minimum will be set as !! = 0.  





7.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
First we can analyze the effect of ∆! on ∆!. Assume we have: 
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= ∆!! −





[ ∆!! !"!" − !"!!
!!!
!!!































The other aspect is a much more complicated one: error introduced by imprecision of 
evidence estimation. First we assume we have M key components and each 
component has N levels which will leads the system choose N different actions. The 
probability of the !!! component is of !!! level situation is assigned as !!!". So the 




























This step will reduce the calculation complexity greatly, because instead of the! ! 
time loop, this algorithm just needs calculate several addition and multiplication. 
Our risk table is a big table with the following structure: 
Table 4. Structure for risk table 
  Action 1 Action 2 … 
Component 1 Level 1 !!!! !!!"  
Level 2 !!"!   
⋮    
Component 2 Level 1 !!"" !!"!  
Level 2    
⋮    
Here we define the notation !!"#, which means the risk of automated system suggests 
component i is at the condition j and the pilot believes they should take action k. So 
we know, 
!!"# = 0! 
for all ! ≤ !.  
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Then the risk of automated system suggest action m and pilot claims taking action n 
should be: 
!!" =
( !"!"!!!!! ∙ !!"#!!!! )!"# !!!
!"!"!!!!!!!! − !"!"!!!!!!!!!!
 
Of them the !!"# are constants that will be evaluated based on old experience. !"!" !is 
evidences estimated by the automated system, which might introduce error.  
And for the cost function, there will be another cost table. So we have: 
!"!" = !!" + !!" 
Here the C matrix is a constant table. So there will not be any disturbance introduced 
in this term. As we described before: 
























7.4 Information Fusion Algorithm 
Now!we! discuss!when! the! two! assessments! from! the! pilot! and! the! automated!
system!agreed!with!each!other.!Assume!we!have!the!pilot’s!suggestion!as:!
!! = !!,!!,⋯ ,!! !
Similarly!we!assume!the!Automated!system!suggest!the!action!should!be:!







,⋯ , !!!!!!!!!!!! !
Assume!the!Action!i!is!the!suggestion!from!the!pilot!and!the!automated!system,!
then!we!know!we!have:!
!! > ∀!! !, !"#!! ≠ !!
!! > ∀!! !, !"#!! ≠ !!
Thus,!







We!also!can!prove! !"#$! ! is!larger!than! !! ! or! !!:!











!!! − !! !!!!!!!!
!!!!!!!! ∙ !!!!!!
!
= !!!! !! + !!!!! − !! !!!! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ∙ !!!!!!
!
= !! !!(!! − !!)!!!!!!!!!!! ∙ !!!!!!
!
As!we!have:!
!! > ∀!! !, !"#!! ≠ !!
So,!
!"#$! − !! > 0!
Similarly!we!can!prove:!
!"#$! − !! > 0!







CHAPTER 8  
STRUCTURE+WITH+FEEDBACK+AND+TIME+SEQUENCES 
 
8.1 Introducing the Feedback Structure 
Decision must be maximally sensitive to pilot and AS’s inputs, and minimally 
sensitive to noise and disturbances. Assume noise or disturbance profile additive or 
multiplicative, then how can we reduce its influence to decision making? So it is 
reasonable to introduce feedback to our system. 
Consider decision-making process as a dynamic system with uncertainty and delays. 
The original structure is shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure+26.+Original+Schematic 
Obviously it is an open loop system, so we can add a Success or Failure module as 
the feedback, to close the loop. The Success or Failure module is used to estimate if 
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the pilot’s actions really has positive effect on the condition of the aircraft and flying. 
For example, the suggested action is “Landing preparation-Engine Maint.” Then the 
pilot takes the action and triggered the following monitoring routines: 
1) The pilot can land the aircraft safely within 500km following provided path 
2) Engine parameters lower than hazard zone 1 
3) Other parameters within normal zone 
4) Outside parameters-OK 
If one of the above criterions is checked as “False”, then the system decides the action 
is failed. Otherwise, the system believes the action is success. 
The revised version of structure (containing Success or Failure Module) is shown in 
Figure 27. 
 




8.2 Output of Success or Failure Module 
So in the updated structure, the pilot will be provided the output of Success or Failure 
Module. If the judgment is “Success”, then the pilot will be given information like 
“Action Provided Success”. Otherwise, the system will provide the details of why the 
suggested actions are failed. For instance, the advisory by the decision-making system 
is “Landing Preparation-Engine Maint.” After the pilot execute the advisory, the 
Success of Failure module will say the following: 
Action Provided -- Failed 
Engine Condition -- higher than hazard zone 1 
IGB -- higher than normal zone 
Then based on the feedback of Success or Failure module the pilot can use the 
provided tuning matrix T to tune the former action vector: 
P!! = T ∙ P!" 
Here the P!"  is the action vector provided by the decision-making system, the 
combined result. P!" is the action vector after adjusted. So when the advisory is 
successful, T will be assigned as identity matrix I. For cases like the failure case we 










p! = 0.1p! + p! + 0.1p!
p! = 0.9p!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
So in general, the matrix T has the following properties 
• When the provided advisory is successful, ! = ! 
• 0 ≤ !!" ≤ 1 
• Because! !
!! = 1 
















As we know 
!! = 1 





Of course we can apply some other ways to assign the value of the T matrix, but 




1. !! might be negative 
2. !! ≠ 1, thus additional normalizing step is needed. 
So the rules above can guarantee the adjusted suggestion vector is reasonable and 
avoid additional calculation. 
 
8. 3 New Expression of the structure 
Now we can express the system as an adaptive system. The new structure, with the 
pilot in the center, is shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure+28.+Pilot+Centered+Structure+with+Adaptive+Control+ +  
Here the success or failure module does not return the result to the pilot, but directly 
adjust the pilot’s estimation. The advantage of this structure is the pilot does not have 
to process too much information and can avoid problems of information overflow.  
An alternative way to deal with this problem is sending the output of Success or 
87!
!
Failure Module directly to the pilot. Thus this output will act as another resource of 
pilot’s evidence. We notice that right now the pilot is no longer equivalent to the 
automated system because the pilot will access more information source and has more 
output instead of only the pilot’s suggested action. So it is reasonable to generate 
another pilot-centered structure, as shown in Figure 29. In the figure around the pilot 
module, there are two information sources: Evidences and Advisory source, which are 
represented by solid line and dashed line respectively. The pilot uses the evidences 
and S/F result to generate the suggested action, and collect the decision making 
system’s final advisory to come up with the action to execute. 
 
Figure+29.+Pilot+Centered+Structure+with+S/F+Module+as+a+Feedback+Module+ +  
With delays considered, the pilot centered architecture is represented in Figure 30. In 
this schematic the delays are represented by the blocks !!!", p is the coefficient 
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related to delay. 
 
Figure+30.+Pilot+Centered+Structure+with+Continuous+Time+Delay+Blocks+ +  
Or discrete form, 
 









vehicle’s! dynamic!performance! it!may!be!possible! to! track! the! conformance!of!
the! vehicle’s! behavior! to! the! commanded! actions! while,! at! the! same! time,!
monitor!and!assess!any!changes! in! the!data!or!observations!both! the!pilot!and!
the!automated!system!are!basing!their!corresponding!decisions/advisories.!
In!that!case!it!is!advisable!to!view!the!overall!system!configuration!as!a!dynamic!
system! and! exploit! any! available! new! information! to! update! the! conflict!
resolution!and!decision!support!processes.!We!introduce!in!this!chapter!system!
architecture!to!achieve!this!task.!
Current! and! past! research! in! this! area! has! considered! the! human9system!
interface!primarily!as!a!once9through!strategy!for!decision!making!problem,!i.e.!
the!decision!making!process!is!executed!once!and!the!pilot!follows!the!advisories!
generated! from! a! combination! of! on9board! data/information! and! his/her! own!
observations/experience.! As! shown! in! Figure! 32,! in! phase! I,! the! pilot! collects!






automated!system’s!advisory!coming! in.! In!phase! II,! the!automated!system!and!
the!pilot!will!hold!for!the!knowledge!base!to!fuse!the!two!advisories!and!resolve!
the! potential! conflicts.! After! the! conflict! is! resolved,! the! knowledge! base! will!
come!up!with!a!final!advisory!and!send!this!advisory!to!the!pilot.!Then!phase!III!




























the! automated! system! has! finished! the! reasoning! and! put! the! action! to! the!
automated!system.!As!there’s!only!one!player!put!his!action!into!the!knowledge!
base,! the! knowledge! base! does! not! have! to! resolve! potential! conflict.! So! the!
knowledge! base! just! has! to! hold! and! tell! the! system! the! final! advisory! is! not!






activated.! After! the! S/F! procedure,! the! advisory! is! success! or! not! will! be!
determined.!
Time! !!:! The! most! updated! automated! system’s! advisory! is! provided! to! the!
knowledge! base,! so! another! conflict! resolution! is! triggered.! Pay! attention! that!
now!the!knowledge!base!has! to!resolve! the!potential!conflict! for!each!advisory!
generation!because!the!pilot’s!action!is!no!longer!zero.!But!the!knowledge!base!
does!not!have!to!estimate!the!pilot’s!action!again!because!it!is!not!updated!yet.! !
Time! !!:! At! this! moment! the! pilot’s! suggestion! is! changed,! so! the! knowledge!






IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS: GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE 
(GUI) 
 
9.1 General Structure 
A! Graphical! User! Interface! (GUI)! using! MATLAB®! has! been! developed! to!
demonstrate!the!structural!aspects!of!the!interface,!shown!in!the!Figure!34.!The!
structure! consists! of! the! following! components:! Pilot’s! Input! Panel,! Estimated!




The! Pilot’s! Input! Panel! is! the! area! where! the! pilot! can! change! the! action!
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sequence! to!be!executed!and! the!corresponding!confidence! level.!The!pilot! can!
choose! the!preferred!action! from!the!action! list! (purple!area)!and!add! it! to! the!
current! sequence,! shown!by! the! blue! area.! Three! buttons! are! located! between!
the!action!list!and!the!sequence:!add,!delete!and!clear!the!sequence,!respectively.!
The!pilot!can!type! in! the!estimated!confidence! in! the!confidence!box!and!press!
the!“Input!Data”!button!to!insert!all!the!information!into!the!knowledge!Base.! !
The! “smart”! knowledge! base!will!match! now! the! sequence! and! the! confidence!
level!with! stored! cases.! Next,! the! knowledge! base! provides! an! estimate! of! the!
pilot’s!action,!shown!in!the!“Estimated!Action!Panel”.!The!probability!of!the!pilot!
taking! one! of! the! actions! ”Continue! Flying”,! ”Landing! Preparation”! and! “Land!
Right!Now”!are!87.5%,!6.5%!and!6%,!respectively.!
On! the! left! down! area! is! the! “Control! Panel”.! This! area! contains! two! buttons:!
Start! and! Pause.! When! the! Start! button! is! pressed,! the! simulation! routine! is!
initiated!and!the!start!button!is!disabled.!If!the!pilot!wants!to!pause!the!routine,!
the!pause!button!is!pressed!and!the!simulation!stops!for!several!seconds.!














“Success! or! Failure”! and! “Detail”.! The! Success! or! Failure! area! will! return! a!





9.2 Final Advisory Generation 







Obviously! this! advisory! is! difficult! to! apply! since! frequent! changes! occur!




!"#$%&'([!] = !"#$%&! ! , !"!!"#$$! ! − !"#$$! ! > 2!"#$%&'( ! − 1 ,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! "ℎ!"#$%!!
where!
! ∈ ! !"#$$! ! ≤ ∀!!"##! ! , 1 ≤ ! ≤ ! !
! ∈ ! !"#$$! ! ≤ ∀!"#$$! ! , 1 ≤ ! ≤ !!!"#!! ≠ ! !








9.3 Success or Failure Module and Time Delays 
It!is!evident!that!time!delay!is!a!key!factor!affecting!the!system’s!performance.!It!
is!important,!therefore,!to!analyze!the!delays!in!each!component!of!the!interface.!




varies! from! person! to! person.! Also,! even! for! the! same! pilot,! this! time! can! be!






sequence! into! the! system.! This! time! also! varies! from! person! to! person.! 10!




























!! = !!!! , !!~!(10!!)!
Automated(System(reasoning(Delay((!!,( !!)(
This!delay!is!illustrated!in!Figure!39.!The!mean!value!of!this!delay!is! 2.09×10!!!
seconds.! The! worst! case! is !8.48×10!! seconds! being! on! the! scale! of! 10!!!
seconds.!
time/s

















!! = !!!! , !!~!(10!!)!
Conflict(Resolution(Delay((!!)(
The! conflict! resolution! delay! corresponds! to! the! time! required! to! resolve!
potential!conflicts.!The!tested!value!is!demonstrated!in!Figure!40.!
time/s #10-5











The!mean!value!of!this!delay!is! 9.89×10!!! seconds!and!thus:! !
!! = !!!! , !!~!(10!!)!
Pilot’s(Execution(delay((!!)!
This!value!also!varies!from!person!to!person.!Here!we!assume:!
!! = !!!! , !!~!(1)!
In! summary,! the! major! time! delay! is! attributed! to! the! time! required! to!















CHAPTER 10  
RESULTS  
 
10.1 Pilot’s Action Estimation 
The simulated Graphical User Interface (GUI) is generated in MATLAB. The 
sections related to the pilot’s actions are depicted in the pilot’s input panel section as 
estimated actions. Figure 41 shows the sequence of estimated actions. In Figure 41(a), 
no pilot’s input is received, and the estimated pilot’s actions are displayed as “N/A”. 
Later the input sequence is set as [Take off, Arriving, Landing], as shown in Figure 
41(b). This implies that the pilot believes there is no fault, and the aircraft can 
continue flying. The estimated action indicates the probability of “continue flying” is 
more than 90%. 
When the pilot senses something abnormal, his confidence is decreased to 50% and 
the estimated probability of “continue flying” decreases also to 52.2%, as shown in 
Figure 41(c). At that instant, the pilot suggests that the aircraft should undergo 
“Engine Maintenance” after it arrives to its destination. So, the estimated probability 
of “landing preparation” rises to 53.3%, as in Figure 41(d).  
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                 (a)                               (b) 
     
                 (c)                                (d) 
     






If the evidence suggests that the situation is more severe, the pilot believes that it is 
necessary to conduct maintenance before the aircraft arrives at its destination. Now, 
safety has a higher priority than arriving at the destination and the estimated 
probability of “landing right now” rises to 40%, as shown in Figure 41(e). Since the 
condition is very severe, the pilot changes his action from “Engine Maintenance” to 
“Engine Repair”. The estimated probability of “landing right now” rises to 64.2% and 
74.3%, with respect to the confidence levels of 80% and 90%, as shown in Figure 
41(f) and Figure 41(g). 
 
Figure(42.(Initial(Estimated(Pilot’s(Intended(Action(  
The complete procedure is depicted in Figure 42. The probabilities of “continue 
flying”, “landing preparation” and “land right now” are shown in blue, red and 
yellow, respectively.  
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uncertainty! of! the! variable! “confidence”,! we! introduce! an! uncertainty! value! in!





10.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory Based Methodology Result 





The application domain (in simulation) for the conflict resolution configuration is the 
Oil-cooler & Intermediate Gearbox (OC-IGB) subsystems of the UH-60 helicopter 
drive system. The complete drivetrain is shown in Figure 44. The OC-IGB subsystem 
is highlighted by the red rectangular area. The components include the oil-cooler, the 
intermediate gearbox, and the tail shaft connecting these components. We define 
appropriate fault modes and suggest data/observations/displays available to the 
operator (pilot). On the other hand, we configure the automated system to accomplish 
sensor data collection and analysis including the diagnostic, prognostic and control 
modules introduced previously.   
10.2.2 Simulation Results 
 
Figure(45.(RUL(predicted(by(the(pilot(and(Automated(System(
The data used in this case study is generated by a MATLAB routine. The features 
discussed above and the status evaluations are extracted from the data set. The pilot’s 
judgment is based on his perception while the Automated System collects the 
pre-processed data and provides the advisories. Then, the decision support system 
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reads the estimations and gives the combined reasoning result. The simulation 
procedure is also carried out in MATLAB.  
Oil Cooler Bearing Crack Level Prognosis 
The pilot and the automated system can both do the prognosis based on the 
information they collected. For instance, in our case, the pilot and the automated 
system can collect information from time 0 to time 3.2. And based on these 
information to predict the 3.2 to 8 system situation, as shown in Figure 45. The upper 
figure is generated by the pilot and the lower one belongs to the automated system. So 
the pilot predicts that the remaining useful life should be [4.5 6.5] with a confidence 
level of 90%. On the other hand, the automated system believes that remaining useful 
life should be [5.7 7.6] with a confidence level of 90%. Here comes the conflict 
between the two reasoning route. So we apply the conflict resolution here to get a 
combined result, as shown in Figure 46. Thus the system status can be got from the 
combined result. For instance, oil bearing crack level for time 5 should be light or 
medium with a confidence level of 60%.  Also we can calculate the MEB and get 
Table 5. The table illustrate that the combined result has much smaller MEB than the 
pilot or AS, which means the combined result reduces the risk, or ignorance, 






Table 5. MEB calculation for each result(
MEB Pilot estimated AS estimated Combined Result 
Light 0.2237 0.0805 0.0480 
Medium 0.3037 0.0842 0.0751 
Severe 0.2152 0.0841 0.0486 





10.3 Game Theory Result 
First, we map the status evaluation to the action set based on the following table. Here, 
Action 1 stands for “continue flying” implying that no action is required. Action 2 
stands for “prepare to land”, which means that maintenance action must be taken after 
the vehicle reaches its destination. Action 3 stands for “land the aircraft immediately”, 
which means that the aircraft’s condition is severe and the pilot must land the vehicle 
immediately. 
Since the automated system monitors the pilot’s suggested action(s) automatically, it 
knows only what action the pilot is taking but not why he takes this particular action 
and its corresponding probability. Thus, the automated system will evaluate the 
current status and will estimate the corresponding probability. For example, we are to 
evaluate the risk for the automated system suggesting Action 1 but the pilot takes 
Action 3. There are four conditions that recommend Action 3 to be taken by the pilot: 
Table 6. Probability for Each Condition 
Condition IGB Oil cooler bearing Probability 
1 Faulty Light Pr! = p!"×p!" 
2 Faulty Medium Pr! = p!"×p!! 
3 Faulty Severe Pr! = p!"×p!" 
4 Normal Severe Pr! = p!"×p!" 





Table 7. Risk Table for Taking Each Action 





Oil cooler bearing 
Crack 
Light 0 0 0 
Medium 16 0 0 
Severe 31 14 0 
IGB 
Normal 0 0 0 
Faulty 42 17 0 




r! = 42Pr! + 58Pr! + 73Pr! + 31Pr! 
The cost corresponding to each action is estimated as follows: 
Table 8. Cost Table for Taking Each Action 
Action Action 1 Action 2 Action 3 
Cost 0 25 50 
Cost for taking Action 1 is, of course, zero. The proposed formulation provides thus 
both cost and risk information. The pilot’s suggested action and the AS’s advisory is 
illustrated in Figure 47. Generally, the situation estimated by the automated system is 
more severe than that of the pilot. Thus, the action suggested by the automated system 
tends to cost more and is more likely to avoid some severe risks. The combined result, 





Figure 47. Suggested actions given by the pilot and Automated System 
 
Figure 48. Combined Advisory  
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10.4 GUI Reasoning Result 





reasoning! phase! and! the! knowledge! base! is! in! a! hold! state! until! the! pilot’s!
suggestion!is!generated!and!the!probabilities!of!the!estimated!actions!are!shown!
as! not! available.! This! is! the! demonstration! of! the! system! condition! between!
time!!!! and! !!,!as!shown!in!Figure!49.!
!





indicating! that! the! first! task! after! time! !! ,! i.e.! action! estimation,! has! been!
accomplished.! The! knowledge! base! undertakes! the! task! now! to! resolve! the!
conflict! between! the! automated! system! and! the! pilot,! and! estimate! the! final!
advisory.! In! the! Combined! Result! figure,! the! advisory! is! changed! to! a! pure!





Figure 50. System Condition at time t1 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  
Figure! 51! illustrates,! as! time! progresses,! when! the! action! provided! by! the!
knowledge!base!is!considered!as!failed.!But!the!final!advisory!is!not!changed!due!
to! this! indicated! failure! because! the! final! advisory! generation! is! decided! by! a!






Figure 51. System Condition at time t2 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  
Then,!the!pilot!takes!more!aggressive!action,!as!illustrated!in!Figure!52.!Thus,!the!
combined! result! is! changed! to! “Landing! Preparation”! and! the! new! action!
provided!is!considered!as!a!success.!
!



















the! human! operator! and! onKboard! automated! processes! for! their! safe,! reliable!
and! robust! operation.! Complexity! issues! and! the! lack! of! a! rigorous!
humanKmachine!interface!have!resulted!over!the!past!years!in!contingencies!that!
is!difficult!or! impossible!to!manage.!This!thesis! introduces!a!system!of!systems!
approach! to! combine! the!human's!observations,! experience!and!expertise!with!
onKboard!automated!processes!that!monitor!the!health!state!of! the!aircraft!and!
reason! about! the! presence! of! detrimental! fault/failure! modes.! The! novel!
reasoning!paradigm!is!employed!to!fuse!evidences,!resolve!conflicts!and!provide!
to! the! human/pilot! the! "best"! advisories! to! the! pilot! needed! to! mitigate! the!




11.1 Main Contribution 
• Provided a methodology for human (pilot, operator)-machine (aircraft, 
process) interface technologies for improved machine performance and 
reduced operator workload 
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• A novel human-machine conflict resolution approach building on concepts 
from Dempster-Shafer Evidential theory and Game Theory intended to 
provide the "best" advisories to the operator for action in the event of machine 
contingencies (fault/failure modes) 
• Defined reasonable performance metrics for the knowledge base to match new 
cases with the stored ones.  
• Developed a MATLAB® Graphical User Interface (GUI) to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our human-machine interface structure 
11.2 Remaining Work 
• More components and more fault modes can be further considered and 
generate a more complete demonstration 
• Pick up suitable hardware to build the corresponding touchscreen panel and 
test the system.  
• Redesign the interface in the cockpit and include the sections related to pilot’s 
in the newly designed panel 
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